We prove that determinacy for all Boolean combinations of F σδ (Π 0 3 ) sets implies the consistency of second-order arithmetic and more. Indeed, it is equivalent to the statement saying that for every set X and every number n, there exists a β-model of Π 1 n -comprehension containing X. We prove this result by providing a careful level-by-level analysis of determinacy at the finite level of the difference hierarchy on F σδ (Π 0 3 ) sets in terms of both reverse mathematics, complexity and consistency strength. We show that, for n ≥ 1, determinacy for sets at the nth level in this difference hierarchy lies strictly between (in the reverse mathematical sense of logical implication) the existence of β-models of Π 1 n+2 -comprehension containing any given set X, and the existence of β-models of ∆ 1 n+2 -comprehension containing any given set X. Thus the nth of these determinacy axioms lies strictly between Π 1 n+2 -comprehension and ∆ 1 n+2 -comprehension in terms of consistency strength. The major new technical result on which these proof theoretic ones are based is a complexity theoretic one. The nth determinacy axiom implies closure under the operation taking a set X to the least Σ n+1 admissible containing X (for n = 1, this is due to Welch [2012]).
Introduction
There are several common ways to calibrate the strength of mathematical or set theoretic assertions. One venerable one is proof theoretic. We say that a theory T is proof theoretically stronger (or of higher consistency strength) than one S, T > c S, if T proves the consistency of S. (Here one assumes that the languages and theories being considered are countable, include basic arithmetic (or some natural interpretation of it as in set theory) and are equipped with a standard Gödel numbering of sentences and proofs so that the statement that S is consistent has a natural representation, Con(S), in the language as does T Con(S).) This ordering is strict by Gödel's incompleteness theorem, i.e. for no reasonable T can T Con(T ).
Another important calibration is that provided by reverse mathematics. Here one works in the setting of second order arithmetic, i.e. the usual first order language and structure M, +, ×, <, 0, 1 supplemented by distinct variables X, Y, Z that range over a collection S of subsets of the domain M of the first order part and the membership relation ∈ between elements of M and S. Most of countable or even separable classical mathematics can be developed in this setting based on very elementary axioms about the first order part of the model M, an induction principle for sets and various set existence axioms. At the bottom one has a weak system of axioms called RCA 0 that correspond to recursive constructions. One typically then adds additional existence axioms to get other systems P .
The endeavor here is to calibrate the complexity of mathematical theorems by determining precisely which system P of axioms are needed to prove a give theorem Θ. This is done in one direction in the usual way showing that P Θ. The other direction is a "reversal" that shows that RCA 0 + Θ P . The standard text here is Simpson [2009] to which we refer the reader for general background. There is also a brief presentation of the subject and the standard systems in Montalbán and Shore [2012] of which this paper is really a continuation. We henceforth refer to Montalbán and Shore [2012] as [MS] and rely heavily on its proofs and results.
One natural hierarchy of axiomatic (or proof theoretic) systems is given by Π 1 n -CA 0 and ∆ 1 n -CA 0 : the axioms that say that every set defined by a Π 1 n formula (with set parameters) or, respectively, by both Π n that measure the complexity of prenex normal formulas by the number of alternations of first or second order quantifiers, respectively.) The system at the bottom of this hierarchy, Π 1 1 -CA 0 is the strongest of the systems usually studied in reverse mathematics and so far suffices for almost all mathematical theorems. The systems we consider are all stronger than Π 1 1 -CA 0 and indeed exhaust the hierarchy with examples provable from Π 1 n -CA 0 but not ∆ 1 n -CA 0 for each n ≥ 3 and even one not provable in full second order arithmetic, Z 2 = ∪{Π 1 n -CA 0 |n ∈ ω}. These systems are taken from the realm of axioms of determinacy. This subject has played an important role historically as an inspiration for increasingly strong axioms (as measured by consistency strength) both in reverse mathematics and set theory. We have given a brief overview of this history in [MS, §1] and refer the reader to that paper for more historical details and other background.
In that paper we analyzed the reverse mathematical strength of a hierarchy of low levels of determinacy axioms, n-Π 0 3 -DET and ω-Π 0 3 -DET, which we now define. Definition 1.1 (Games and Determinacy). Our games are played by two players I and II. They alternate playing 0 or 1 with I playing first to produce a play of the game which is a sequence x ∈ 2 ω . A game G A is specified by a subset A of 2 ω . We say that I wins a play x of the game G A specified by A if x ∈ A. Otherwise II wins that play. A strategy for I (II) is a function σ from binary strings p of even (odd) length into {0, 1}. It is a wining strategy if any play x following it (i.e. x(n) = σ(x n) for every even (odd) n) is a win for for I (II). We say that the game G A is determined if there is a winning strategy for I or II in this game. If Γ is a class of sets A, then we say that Γ is determined if G A is determined for every A ∈ Γ. We denote the assertion that Γ is determined by Γ determinacy or Γ-DET.
Recall that the Π 0 3 subsets of 2 ω are the F σδ ones, i.e. the countable intersections of countable unions of closed sets or equivalently the ones definable by formulas of the Π 0 3 form ∀n∃m∀kR(x, n, m, k, Z) for some recursive predicate R and Z ∈ 2 ω . There are a couple of equivalent definitions of the natural hierarchy on the Boolean combinations of these sets (or ones from any class Γ) called the (finite) difference hierarchy. Here is one that generalizes into the transfinite. If carried out through ℵ 1 many steps, it exhausts all of the ∆ While we used this standard definition for our proofs of determinacy in [MS] (see Theorem 1.5 below), we there used another one for our negative results (see Theorem 1.6 below). We utilize that representation for our major technical result, Theorem 1.8, here as well.
ω and x ∈ A ⇔ the least i such that x ∈ A i is even.
We say that the sequence A i |i ≤ m represents A (as a Π 0 3,n set).
For the purposes of establishing or contradicting determinacy the two hierarchies are equivalent and so we may use either class in our proofs about n-Π When we spoke about these results at Berkeley, John Steel asked the natural question of whether we could improve our reverse mathematical result that ω-Π 0 3 -DET is not provable in Z 2 to show that it actually implies the consistency of Z 2 . If so, while the two theories are incomparable in sense of reverse mathematics, ω-Π 0 3 -DET would be strictly stronger than Z 2 in the proof theoretic one. This appears to be a delicate proof theoretic question falling outside the scope of our usual recursion or set theoretic methods as the results of [MS] show that ω-Π 0 3 -DET does not prove the existence of an ω-model of Z 2 . (See Corollary 1.16.) Nonetheless, in this paper we show that this is indeed the case and that much more is true by proving stronger results at every step along the finite difference hierarchy. Our goals here are thus primarily proof theoretic but we also prove reverse mathematical and recursion (complexity) theoretic results and then use them to establish the proof theoretic ones.
In this setting, all the theories we might consider are formulated in the language of second order arithmetic and include at least RCA 0 although we generally omit explicitly mentioning the inclusion of RCA 0 in our theories. Thus we can take a standard formulation of Con(T ).
We also note that, in the context of reverse mathematics, a structure for a first order language is an, of course countable, set and collection of relations and functions as usual but we also assume the elementary diagram is given as well. If the theory is one of second order arithmetic we add on a countable set S of subsets of the domain M of the model M as the range of the second order quantifiers. (Simpson [2009] calls these countably coded models as its collection of allowed sets must be coded into a single set.) Such a model M = M, S, ∈, +, ×, <, 0, 1 is an ω-model if M = N (the "true" natural numbers). It is a β-model if, in addition, every Π In fact, all the theories we actually consider imply Π 1 1 -CA 0 (over RCA 0 ) and so we use the available interpretations between second order arithmetic and the language of set theory and the development of L and its fine structure in Π [MS] as well as some standard fine structure facts. In particular, for n ≥ 2, if α n is the least Σ n admissible ordinal then L αn is the least β-model of ∆ 1 n+1 -CA 0 . Similarly, if ρ n is the least Σ n nonprojectable ordinal, then L ρ n is the least β-model of Π 1 n+1 -CA 0 and if β 0 is the least ordinal which is Σ n admissible for every n (or equivalently Σ n nonprojectable for every n), then L β 0 is the least β-model of Z 2 , (In all these situations when we refer to an L γ as a structure for second order arithmetic we mean the ω-model with sets S taken to be L γ ∩ R.)
These relations between admissible fragments of L and our strong proof theoretic systems are really an extension of the usual correspondences between the standard weaker proof theoretic systems and standard recursion theoretic constructions. In particular, the system ACA 0 corresponds to closure under the Turing jump; ATR 0 , to closure under transfinite iterations of the Turing jump; and Π Shore [2010] for an exposition of the correspondences between the recursion theoretic structures and ω-models of the proof theoretic systems.) The natural extensions of the jump and hyperjump operators to larger ordinals are given by the master code hierarchy for countable initial segments of L (see, for example, Hodes [1980] ). In particular, the jumps corresponding to ∆ 1 n+1 -CA 0 and Π 1 n+1 -CA 0 for n ≥ 2 are the closures under the operators taking X to the least Σ n admissible and Σ n nonprojectable sets containing X. Here the correspondence moves from ω-models to β-models. In this language, our results (Corollary 1.11) show that the natural operator taking X to the least model of n-Π 0 3 -DET containing X lies strictly between the closure under the next Σ n+1 admissible and under the next Σ n+1 nonprojectable. We do not know of any other similar natural operators.
We use this correspondence to achieve our primary goal of locating the consistency strength of n-Π 0 3 -DET for each n and of ω-Π 0 3 -DET with respect to the standard fragments of Z 2 . To be precise, we will prove (Corollaries 1.14 and 1.16) that, Π conservative extension of Z 2 .) In fact, we will prove that in each case the distance between each side of the inequality is much greater than simple > c . The main technical result we need will be recursion theoretic in the sense just described:
The case n = 1 is due to Welch [2011, 2012] . We prove this result for n ≥ 2 in §2. To facilitate our proof theoretic goals, it is also helpful to introduce an operation on theories T of second order arithmetic that significantly increases consistency strength. Definition 1.9. If T is a theory in the language of second order arithmetic, then β(T ) is the theory which says that for every set X there is a β-model of T containing X.
Note that for any (at least reasonably definable theory) T , not only is β(T ) > c T but it is significantly stronger than T in terms of consistency strength. Indeed, while the provability of the existence of a model of T always implies consistency, and is equivalent to the provability of Con(T ) (even over the theory WKL 0 ), the provability of the existence of even an ω-model of T implies not only Con(T ) but also, for example, Con(T +Con(T )) and iterations of this operation into the transfinite. The point here is that for any, say arithmetic, T , Con(T ) is a sentence of arithmetic and so, if provable from S, S also proves that it is true in any ω-model of T . Thus if S proves that there is an ω-model of T then it also proves that there is one of T + Con(T ) etc. Of course, by Gödel's incompleteness theorem, it can never be the case that T β(T ). With this terminology we can state our main reverse mathematical theorem in which we include for convenience the main results of [MS] and some simple facts and consequences. Theorem 1.10. For every n ≥ 1 we have the following provability relations none of which can be reversed.
1.
Proof. When we want to establish β(T ) for some theory T , we simply show that there is a β-model of T and note that β(T ) always follows by a straightforward relativization. Similarly, when proving some assertion with set parameters from β(T ), we ignore the set parameter and argue from the existence of a β-model of T and leave the insertion of parameters to relativization. The first implication is Theorem 1.1 of [MS] . For (2), we note that the proof of Theorem 6.1 of [MS] can be carried out in Π 1 n+2 -CA 0 . Given (1) applying that theorem to n-Π 0 3 -DET, produces a δ which is a limit of admissibles such that L δ is a model of n-Π 0 3 -DET. Recall that if δ is a limit of admissibles, L δ is a β-model. That (1) cannot be reversed follows from (2) as for all of these theories T , T β(T ). That (2) cannot be reversed follows from noticing that the proof of (2) above shows that, from Π 1 n+2 -CA 0 , one can prove the existence of a δ such that L δ is a β-model of n-Π 0 3 -DET. Iterating this construction ω many times and taking the limit produces an ordinal γ such that L γ is a model (even a β-model) of β(n-Π 0 3 -DET ). The fact that this iteration is possible follows, for example, from Σ 1 2 -DC 0 which is a consequence of Π 1 n+2 -CA 0 by Simpson [2009, Theorem VII.6.9] . Now (3) follows from (1) by applying it inside the β-model of Π 1 n+2 -CA 0 given by the hypothesis of (3). That it is not reversible follows from (2) and the fact that
The next implication, (4), follows from the definition of being a β-model: Each instance of n-Π 0 3 -DET is a Σ 1 2 sentence which is true in some β-model and so has a witness in that model. Being a witness is a Π 1 1 fact and so truth in the β-model implies truth. This one is clearly non-reversible.
The next implication, (5), is the proof theoretic heart of this paper. It follows from our main recursion or complexity theoretic result, Theorem 1.8. It gives the existence of the least Σ n+1 admissible ordinal α n+1 and so of L α n+1 which as noted above is the smallest β-model of ∆ 1 n+2 -CA 0 . Of course, this argument relativizes to any X to give the result required in (5). That (5) cannot be reversed takes some work, and we will do this in Section 3, where we show that n-Π 0 3 -DET does not hold in L α * n where α * n is the first limit of n-admissibles.
The final implication follows from a standard fact about admissible ordinals: The Σ n -nonprojectables are cofinal in the first (n + 1)-admissible. So, by the remarks above, L inside any model of ∆ 1 n+2 -CA 0 is n + 1-admissible and within it the Σ n -nonprojectables are β-models of Π 1 n+1 -CA 0 .
One recursion/complexity theoretic corollary of these results is placing the "jump" operator taking a set X to the least ordinal δ such that L δ [X] is a (necessarily β) model of n-Π 0 3 -DET among the more usual operators.
-DET is a limit of admissible ordinals strictly between α * n [X], the first limit of Σ n -admissibles containing X, and ρ n [X], the least Σ n -nonprojectable containing X.
Proof. That δ is between these two ordinals follows from (5), i.e. Theorem 1.8, and (1). That the ordering is strict follows from the proof of nonreversability of (5) in Theorem 3.1 and (2).
Another corollary of (the uniformities in the proofs of) implications (1), (3), (4) and (5) Corollary 1.12. Over RCA 0 , the following are equivalent:
• ∀n(β(Π 1 n -CA 0 )), that is, for every n and every X there is a β-model of Π 1 n -CA 0 containing X. Corollary 1.13. The least ordinal δ such that L δ ω-Π 0 3 -DET is ∪α n , the supremum of the least Σ n admissibles over n ∈ ω. As can be seen from the proof of Theorem 1.8, this ordinal is also the least such that L δ contains winning strategies for all light-faced ω-Π 0 3 games.
Our basic assertions about consistency strength along the hierarchies follow immediately from the numbered implications (2), (5) and (6) of Theorem 1.10. Corollary 1.14. For every n ≥ 1 we have the following chain of consistency strength relations:
An immediate corollary of this chain (and compactness) is an equiconsistency result for Z 2 . Corollary 1.15. (RCA 0 ) The following are equiconsistent: 1. Z 2 , i.e., the scheme which contains, for each n ∈ N, the axiom Π 1 n -CA 0 .
2. The scheme which contains, for each n ∈ N, the axiom n-Π 0 3 -DET.
3. ZF C − , i.e. ZF C without the power set axiom.
Proof. The equiconsistency of the first two is our immediate corollary. That for Z 2 and ZF C − follows from the usual interpretation of ZF C − in Z 2 as in Simpson [2009, Ch . VII] and in particular Theorem VII.5.10 and VII.5.17 there as well as remarks in [MS] . We can say more at level ω but not too much. Proof. The chain of consistency strengths is immediate. As for ω-Π 0 3 -DET, the proof of Theorem 1.10(5) shows that it proves (over RCA 0 , or equivalently, Π
is a sentence of first order arithmetic it is true in every β-model (indeed every ω-model). In particular, it is true in all the β-models of Π 1 n+1 -CA 0 proven to exist by ω-Π 0 3 -DET. Thus ω-Π 0 3 -DET proves that, for every n, there is a β-model of Π 1 n+1 -CA 0 + Con(Z 2 ) and so Con(Z 2 + Con(Z 2 )). We can now iterate this argument by induction.
Finally, ω-Π 0 3 -DET does not prove that there is an ω-model of Z 2 because from (1) of Theorem 1.10 we get that ω-Π 0 3 -DET holds in any ω-model of Z 2 . That the same assertions hold for ZF C − follows as in the previous Corollary.
2 β-models and ∆ 1 n+2 -CA 0
In this section we prove our main result. Welch [2012] has characterized the complexity of Π 0 3 -DET in terms of the level of L at which strategies must first appear by a condition reminiscent of those used here and in [MS §5] . The case n = 1 in the Theorem follows easily from his characterization and a simple fact cited in Welch [2011, Proposition 1] from Burgess [1986] (Welch, personal communication). (The fact that an ordinal ζ for which there is a Σ such that L ζ 2 L Σ is Σ 2 admissible is true even if Σ is a nonstandard element of a model of V = L.) Our proof does not work for n = 1, so we fix an n ≥ 2 and proceed by defining a class G of games G and proving two lemmas.
Lemma 2.1. If α n+1 does not exists, then no G ∈ G is determined.
Lemma 2.2. If α n+1 does not exists, then there is a n-Π 0 3 game G ∈ G.
We begin with the class G of games. It is formally defined as consisting of all the games whose winning conditions satisfy four properties given below. Informally, we specify the objectives of the game in terms of building models of the theory
(This theory T replaces the T n of [MS §5] but no significant changes will be needed here because of the substitution.) Note that by [MS, Lemma 3.5] and the relations described above between nonprojectability and models of Π 1 n+1 -CA 0 , this theory is equivalent to KP +V = L + ∀γ(L γ is countable inside L γ+1 ). So a model of T looks like an admissible initial segment of L less than β 0 . In particular, in it all sets are countable. Of course, if the model is well-founded then it is an L α for an admissible ordinal α ≤ β 0 . Intuitively, the objective of each player in these games is to build a model of T whose well-founded part is longer than the opponent's (with ties going to I). The games are designed so that being determined would force the existence of α n+1 . To be precise, we interpret the play of each player in one of our games as the characteristic function of a set of sentences in the language of set theory and specify conditions that, if satisfied, determine a winner of the game. We do this by giving a sequence of conditions with the understanding that the first one to be satisfied tells us which player wins the game. If none of the conditions is satisfied, any determination of a winner places the game in G. (Once we see how to describe the conditions by Π 0 3 sets this will fit the Π 0 3,n hierarchy of Definition 1.3. Determinacy for that hierarchy is equivalent to that for the n-Π 0 3 one level by level as noted in Remark 1.4. We then also have to organize the conditions into a sequence of the required length.)
We begin with easily defined (i.e. simpler even than Π 0 3 ) conditions that set the basic conditions for our models.
G1. Each player has to play a complete consistent theory extending T in the sense that if I fails to do this then II wins while if II fails to do this (while I does play such a theory), then I wins. Next, i.e. assuming neither player has lost yet in this way, we let M I and M II be the term-models of these theories (see [MS, We are now faced with the problem of comparing the two models M I and M II . Intuitively we want to compare them in the sense of containment but we only have them as term models so all we can hope for is an isomorphism from one to an initial segment of the other. If they were both well-founded, this is not hard to understand as both are then admissible initial segments of L. However, the models may be ill-founded. We need a definition that makes sense in all cases and does the right thing when at least one is well-founded. The crucial idea is to reduce everything to subsets of ω by the countability of every L β inside each model and then use the fact that, as both are ω-models, there is an easily definable isomorphism between ω M I and ω M II (the identity on the terms n = 1 + 1 · · · + 1). The following definition captures this notion and slightly abuses notation by naming the relation between models as containment. We use notations such as On M I and R M I to denote the obvious sets in M I (the ordinals in M I and the subsets of ω M I in M I , respectively) and similarly for M II . We will use M :: when we want to consider either or both of M I and M II ambiguously and will use similar notation for other objects subscripted by I and II.
By a real x coding a structure such as < on an ordinal or ∈ on an L β (in M :: ), we mean that when we view x as a set of pairs of natural numbers the relation defined by that set of pairs is isomorphic to the one in M :: . We note that in [MS, §5] we wrote R M I ⊆ R M II and suggested that the desired relation should be containment of the reals in the two models. This is not what is required nor what is used there. Claim 5.3 of [MS] gives the same definition as here in (5.1) but for coding ordinals β in place of L β and that is the formal notion used for containment in [MS] . We here code all of L β (and so, of course, β recursively in that code) simply because we primarily need the L β and this version eliminates the need to think about going from β to L β in the codes. There is no real difference between the choices.
Armed with this definition we can state the remaining winning conditions We next turn to Lemma 2.1. It's proof is fairly short if somewhat tricky. Most of the ideas in the proof appear in the hint for Exercise 1.4.2 in a draft of a book by Martin [n.d.] . In that exercise one is asked to prove H. Friedman's result [1971] that Σ 4 -DET implies the existence of β 0 .
Proof of Lemma 2.1. Suppose G ∈ G and assume that α n+1 does not exist. We show that no player has a winning strategy for G.
We first claim that the set Y = {α| L α |= T and every member of L α is definable in L α } is unbounded. If not, let δ = sup Y , and let α be the least admissible ordinal greater than δ. Let M be the elementary submodel of L α consisting of all its definable elements. Then δ ∈ M. Since α n+1 does not exist, every set is countable, and hence there is a bijection between ω and δ and the < L -least such bijection belongs to M. Thus δ ⊆ M, indeed δ + 1 ⊆ M. Since the Mostowski collapse of M is admissible and contains δ + 1, it must be L α . It follows that every member of L α is definable in L α and hence that α ∈ Y for the desired contradiction.
Suppose now that player I has a winning strategy σ for G. Let α ∈ Y be such that σ ∈ L α . We claim, for our desired contradiction, that if I follows σ and II plays T h α , the theory of L α , II wins. First, player I will not play T h α , because if he did, then following σ would produce exactly the same moves as playing against a strategy for II that just copies I's moves. Hence σ could compute the full play of this game and so T h α . However, T h α ∈ L α because every member of L α is definable in L α and truth for L α is not.
So, M I = M II . Now we have to consider conditions G3 and G4. As we are assuming
, and hence the reals in M I all belong to L α+2 . So if M I is well-founded it is an admissible proper initial segment of L α = M II and G3 does not apply but G4(a) does and II wins G. If M I is ill-founded, then the well-founded part of M I is included in L α as otherwise it would go beyond L α and so contain reals beyond L α+2 . So II wins again. Thus, in any case, we have contradicted the assumption that I has a winning strategy for G.
Finally, suppose that II has a winning strategy σ for G. Again, let α ∈ Y be such that σ ∈ L α . We claim that if I plays T h α , he wins. Note that II cannot copy I's moves, or he would loose by G2. The rest of the argument is analogous to the one above with I winning by either G3(a) or G3(b) depending on whether M II is well-founded or not.
We now turn to the new and much more difficult Lemma 2.2. Our proof will rely heavily on the machinery developed in §5 of [MS] with which we assume familiarity.
Proof of Lemma 2.2
We begin by describing various Π 0 3 conditions (i.e. sets) a Boolean combination of which could be used to specify a game G ∈ G. We then show how to reorganize the game so as to get one that it is Π 0 3,n and show that it is in G. (Making G a Π 0 3,n game suffices by Remark 1.4.) Note that to show that a game G is in G it suffices to prove that for every play of the game which has a winner determined by the rules of G, the specification of G determines the same winner.
Our description incorporates variants of most of the conditions of [MS, §5] (as well as some new ones) and we rely on many of the facts about them proved there with T in place of T n .
First we can clearly guarantee that G1 is satisfied by using the following conditions: ) and so saying that some sentence of set theory is true in M :: is recursive in the play. Also the map from n to the term denoting n in M :: is recursive.)
If M I M II we need to let II win if M II is well-founded and let I win if M II is not and M I is its well-founded part. In §2.2 we introduce a new condition (R I new) to handle this case. Similarly if M II M I we need to let I win if M I is well-founded and let II win if M I is not and M II is its well-founded part. We here use an analogous condition (R II new).
If M I and M II are incomparable, then the only cases we are interested in, i.e. for which the definition of G determines a winner of the game, are ones when one of the models is well-founded. In these cases we will use conditions (R I 2 + k) and (R II 2 + k) for k ≥ 1 similar to the ones of [MS, §5] with the same labels to verify that the definition of G is satisfied.
We now turn to a description of the conditions not yet defined. We assume from now on that M I and M II are distinct ω-models of T as will be guaranteed by our final organization of the conditions (R I 0), (R II 0), (R I 1), (R II 1) and (R I 2) in §2.4. As M I = M II , the rules for G only specify a winner when at least one of them is well-founded.
Thus we can restrict ourselves to this case. We begin with the cases corresponding to G3a and G4a.
Comparable models
We define conditions that will be used to recognized if M II is ill-founded in the case when M I ⊂ M II and if M I is ill-founded in the case when M II ⊂ M I with an eye toward satisfying the rules given by G3(a) and G4(a).
(Recall that A I is the image inside M I of the "intersection" of M I and M II , i.e. the union of all the L β in M I with codes that are in M II as reals which, in M II , also code some L δ . Recall also that A I is Σ 0 2 (see [MS, Claim 5.5] ).) Of course, the notation for II is analogous and we us A to denote ambiguously the structure which is (isomorphic to) A I and A II and the isomorphism between them, i.e. the set of pairs a 1 , a 2 such that the isomorphism takes a 1 ∈ A I to a 2 ∈ A II .) 
Proof. We already know that
Now the crucial fact for our analysis is that certain failures of these conditions produce a well founded Σ n+1 admissible and so would contradict our hypothesis that α n+1 does not exist.
Lemma 2.5. Suppose M I is the well-founded part of M II and
Then M I is Σ n+1 admissible. The same is true with I and II interchanged.
Proof. We prove that M I is Σ k admissible by induction on k ≤ n + 1. For k = 1, this holds by our condition that M I is a model of KP . So assume it is k − 1 admissible but not k admissible for k ≤ n + 1. Let a function f witnessing the failure of k admissibility be defined by the Σ k formula ∃uϕ(x, y, u) where ϕ is Π k−1 . As every set in M I is countable we may assume that the domain of f is ω. Of course, f is unbounded in M I . Consider now the formula θ(x, y 0 , y 1 ) ≡ ϕ(x, y 0 , y 1 ) & ∀z < L y 1 ¬ϕ(x, y 0 , z). By Σ k−1 admissibility the second conjunct is equivalent (in M I ) to a Σ k−1 formula saying that there is a function from {z|z < L y 1 } to the associated witness that ϕ(x, y 0 , z) fails. Consider now the set S defined in
It is clear from the definition of S that for each x ∈ ω there is at most one y 0 , y 1 ∈ L β put into S by x. On the other hand, for each x ∈ ω there is a unique y 0 , y 1 satisfying θ in M I (as f is a function y 0 is unique and y 1 was defined to be least such that ϕ(x, y 0 , z)). This y 0 , y 1 must also satisfy θ in L M II β as θ is a conjunct of a Π k−1 and a Σ k−1 formula and
it would satisfy it in M I but as above there is only one such pair in M I . Thus the only pair put into S by x ∈ ω in M II is the unique y 0 , y 1 such that M I θ(x, y 0 , y 1 ). Thus S ⊆ M I and, as f was unbounded in M I , we have that ∪S = ∪M I and so we have defined the well founded part of M II in M II for a contradiction.
The same proof works with I and II interchanged.
The consequence of this key fact that we need to satisfy G3(a) and G4(b) is the following:
Lemma 2.6. If M I ⊆ M II and M I is well-founded, then (R I new) holds if and only if M I is equal to the well-founded part of M II . The same is true with I and II interchanged Proof. If M I is not equal to the well-founded part of M II , then the well-founded part of M II is strictly greater than that of M I by our assumptions. Thus there is a β ∈ On
and so the required failure of (R I new).
For the other direction of our if and only if, suppose that M I is the well-founded part of M II , but that (R I new) does not hold. By Lemma 2.5, M I is n + 1-admissible contradicting our basic assumption that α n+1 does not exist.
For the remaining cases, we have to primarily consider those where neither M I norM II is contained in the other. In this case, we can assume that exactly one of them is wellfounded. (Two well founded models of V = L are always comparable and we already know that one has to be well-founded for the play to be relevant.) In this case it suffices, by the definition of G, to guarantee the player producing the well-founded model wins.
Incomparable models
If M I and M II are incomparable (as will be guaranteed at some point in our game by the failure of previous conditions) we may assume that exactly one of them is well-founded. As in [MS] the well-founded one is denoted by M and the ill-founded one by N . We want to identify the one which is well founded to determine the winner so as to satisfy G3(b) and G4(b). Each condition in the sequence to be described below asks for a descending chain in one of the models. The failure of each successive condition produces a model with one more level of admissibility. If one condition succeeds then we identify the well founded model and can declare a winner consistent with G3(b) and G4(b). If all of them fail we produce a Σ n+1 admissible for the desired contradiction.
We start by pointing out an omission in the proof in [MS, §5] . The idea in the definition there of the (R :: 2 + k) is that we want it to provide evidence that one of the models is ill-founded by finding a set of ordinals without a least element. For this to work the set must, of course, be non-empty. That condition was left out in [MS] . So the definitions in [MS] should read as follows for k = 1: (R I 3): C M II ,1 is not empty and has no least element. (R II 3): C M I ,1 is not empty and has no least element. For k > 1, they should be
is not empty and has no least element.
It is noted in [MS, p. 242] , that the sets
M I ,k (whose definitions are discussed below) are all Σ 0 2 and so adding the requirement that they be nonempty does not affect the calculations of [MS, §5] that all these conditions are Π 0 3 . To see that this change makes no significant difference in the rest of [MS, §5] it is important to remember that at this point in [MS] we can actually assume that the two models are incomparable as we had previous conditions asserting that M I ⊆ M II and then M II ⊆ M I which proceeded all the conditions (R :: 2 + k). We also there knew that exactly one of them is well-founded. Now note that Claim 5. Unfortunately, in our game will not be able to know that the models are incomparable until after we consider (R I 3), (R II 3) and (R I 4). This necessitates a real modification in the definition of C β 1 ,β 2 M II ,k and ( k−1 ) which are used above to define the (R :: (2 + k)) for k > 1. The change is that we allow the use of ∞ as a value for β 1 or β 2 in ( k ), C . Looking ahead, the advantage of this change is that now, if M I ⊆ M II , we might still have that ( 1 )(∞, β 2 ) for some β 2 when it might fail for every β 1 ∈ M I (which is well-founded).
We start by re-defining ( k ) in this way.
( k )(β 1 , β 2 ) :
means that the two structures are elementary equivalent for Σ k formulas with parameters from A (understood as A I in L
The fact that k is a Π 0 2 property (of β 1 and β 2 ) remains unchanged (see [MS, Lemma 5.7] ).
Recall now the definition of C Finally the conditions ((R :: (2 + k))) for k > 1 now allow β 1 and β 2 to be ∞ without any further change.
We do not need to change the definitions of the sets needed for (R :: 3) as they have no parameters β but we recall them to clarify the argument below that forces us to consider the value ∞ in 1 in (R :: 4) when they fail.
C M I ,1 is defined analogously. We must now verify the key properties of the modified conditions ((R :: (2 + k))) established in [MS, §5] for the original ones. When M I and M II are incomparable, as remarked above, one of them, denoted by M, is well-founded and the other, denoted by N , is not. In this case, the proofs of the primary ingredients, Claims 5.6 and Lemmas 5.10 and 5.11, and the ancillary facts required all work as in [MS] with trivial modifications or even simplifications to accommodate the possibility that β 1 or β 2 is ∞. (Lemmas 5.7 and 5.9 work even without the assumption of incomparability.) The only change caused by our replacing T n by T is in the proof of Lemma 5.10. Note that we know that α ∈ M is not Σ m admissible for some m by the choice of T , we can use such an m for the n in the proof in [MS] .
As we shall see in our final organization of the conditions in the next section, the only situation in which we have to rely on any of these facts without being able to assume that M I and M II are incomparable is the argument that 1 holds for some β 1 and β 2 if (R I 3) and (R II 3) both fail. We analyze this situation when it occurs in the next section.
Organizing the Conditions and Verifications
Formally we define our Π 0 3,n game G by a list of n many Π 0 3 sets A 0 , A 1 . . . , A n−1 followed by A n = 2 ω . Remember that I wins if the first of these sets containing the play of our game has an even index and otherwise, i.e. the first one has an odd index, II wins. The table below contains the definition of the A i arranged with the even index ones in column I and the odd index ones in column II in alternating blocks.
win for I win for II
We end this list with A n−1 corresponding to (R II (1 + n)) ∨ (R II (2 + n)) if n ≥ 2 is even and (R I (1 + n)) ∨ (R I (2 + n)) if n > 2 is odd. (Recall that we are only proving our theorem for n ≥ 2.) This gives us n many conditions. We finish the description of the game in standard Π 0 3,n format by adding on the the full space 2 ω as our (n + 1)st and last set A n . We now argue that the game G specified by this sequence of Π 0 3 sets is in G. If not, then there is a play of G that violates the defining conditions of G. We consider any play and the set in our sequence in which it first appears and verify that we have not violated the definition of G.
We begin with a play in A 0 . By the definition of A 0 , I has played a complete consistent extension of T whose term model M I is an ω-model (as ¬R II 0 and ¬R II 1 hold and so I has not lost the game yet according to G1). We now check each of the disjunctions in the rest of the definition of A 0 to see that a win by I given by satisfying the disjunction is consistent with our definition of G. If R I 0 or R I 1 holds then I wins by G1. If they fail then II has played a complete consistent extension of T whose term model M II is an ω-model. If M I = M II then I wins by G2. Suppose now that M I = M II . Remember that from now on we only need to consider plays of the game in which at least one of the models is well-founded to verify that the winner declared by G is consistent with the definition of G. If (R I new) holds then M I ⊂ M II by our assumption and the definition of the condition. As we are assuming that (at least) one of the models is well-founded, M I is certainly well-founded. Then by Lemma 2.6, M I is the well-founded part of M II but, as the models are not equal, M II is not well-founded and I wins according to G3b. Next, if (R I 3) holds we only have to verify that the play cannot be a win for II according to the rules for G, i.e. G4a or G4b. Now both of these require that M II is well-founded but (R I 3) says that it is not. So neither condition can require a win for II as desired.
We now move to A 1 under the assumption that the play is not in A 0 . First if R II 0 or R II 1 hold then II wins the game according to G1. If not, we again have the two models M I and M II being distinct and we need only consider the case that at least one is well-founded.
Suppose then that the next condition, M I ⊆ M II , holds and so M I must be wellfounded. Under these conditions, the failure of (R I new) implies, by Lemma 2.6, that M I is not the well-founded part of M II and so neither G3a nor G3b can apply. Thus it is consistent with the definition of G that we declare a win for II.
The next case is that (R II new) holds and so in particular, M II ⊆ M I , M II at least must be well-founded and, by Lemma 2.6 again, M II is the well-founded initial segment of M I which cannot be well-founded as M I = M II . Once again neither G3a nor G3b can apply and we are safe.
Next we have (R II 3). If it holds then M I is not well-founded and once again we can safely declare a win for II. Finally, we have to consider the case that all the previous conditions have failed but (R II 4) holds. If we knew that there were β 1 and β 2 for which 1 holds, we would again know that M I is not well founded and we can declare a win for II. If M I and M II are incomparable then, as noted above, Claim 5.6 of [MS] holds and as remarked there (in the second paragraph before [MS, Lemma 5.7] ), 1 holds for the β 1 and β 2 described there. Thus we may assume that M II ⊂ M I and M II is well-founded. The failure of (R II new) then tells us that M II is not equal to the well-founded part of M I . Thus there is a β ∈ On M I − A and indeed that α = ∪On M II ∈ M I − A. We then have 1 (∞, α) as required.
Now if the play of the game is not in A 0 or A 1 then we have our models M I and M II . If both are well founded then they are comparable and, by the failure to get into A 0 or A 1 , M II ⊂ M I and according to G3a I should win the game. We claim this outcome is always in A 2 as desired If we are considering n = 2 (and the sequence of sets from our table ends with A 1 ) then this is trivial since A 2 = 2 ω . If n > 2 then it is in A 2 by the first clause of its definition. Thus we may assume from now on (in our check of consistency with the definition of G) that exactly one of the models is well-founded.
Next suppose that M II ⊆ M I so M II is well-founded and not M I . The failure of (R II new) and Lemma 2.6 then says that M II is not the well-founded initial segment of M I . Thus both G4a and G4b fail and it is safe for us to declare a win for I. From this point on in our argument we may assume that M I and M II are incomparable as well as that exactly one is well-founded. Thus we have Lemmas 5.10 and 5.11 of [MS] available. Together they say that if, for some play of our game, for all i ≤ 2 + k the conditions ((R :: (2 + i)) fail, then there are β 1 and β 2 satisfying k and there is a Σ k+1 admissible ordinal. So, as at this point (R I 3) and (R II 3) fail, there are β 1 and β 2 such that 1 holds. Thus if (R I 4) holds, M II is not well-founded and it is safe to declare a win for I. If (R I 4) fails, then we have a Σ 3 admissible ordinal which is a contradiction for the case n = 2 and we have finished our verification. If n > 2, (R I 4) fails but (R I 5) holds, M II is once again not well-founded as we already knew that (R II 4) failed by the fact that our play is not in A 1 . Thus we may safely declare a win for I.
Next consider n = 3. We already know that our play getting into A 0 , A 1 or A 2 is consistent with being in G. If it fails to get into A 0 , A 1 or A 2 , but satisfies (R II 5) or ¬(R II 5) ∧ (R II 6) then M I is not well-founded as in the previous cases and it is safe to declare a win for II. If both fail, then the Lemmas provide a Σ 4 admissible ordinal for the desired contradiction. The analysis for all n > 3 is now the same as for n = 3 and we have that for every n ≥ 2 our Π 0 3,n game given by the specifications above is in G to complete the proof of Lemma 1.6.
No reversal
We now prove that (5) in Theorem 1.10 does not reverse. That is, for every n ≥ 2, β(∆ The proof that this is enough to get that R ∩ L α * n |= (n − 1)-Π 0 3 -DET is exactly that of the corresponding result in [MS] simply making the replacements above.
The proof of Lemma 3.2 is similar to that of [MS, Lemma 1.8] given there in §5 with the corrections we have noted above. We change T n to be the theory We must now first verify that the new conditions cannot cause a loss for the first player to play T h αn as required. If I plays T h αn and so M I = L α * n , then the worry is that (R Inew * ) and all the other clauses of the first group fail but (R IInew * ) holds. By Lemma 3.3 either M II =A II and so M II ⊆ M I or there is an n-admissible γ such that L M II γ = A II . In the first case, as I did not already win by R I 2, M II ⊂ M I = L α * n for a contradiction to M II being a model of T n . In the second case, as γ is admissible it is not α * n and so is strictly less than α * n . In this case we would have γ + 1 in both M I and M II and so in A for a contradiction. The argument that if II plays T h αn (and so M II = L α * n ) but I does not then I does not win by (R Inew * ) holding is similar.
To continue the argument of [MS, §5] after we pass through the first two groups of clauses, we just note that under the then prevailing assumptions that one of the models is well-founded, and that no model is included in the other, the failure of both (R Inew * ) and (R IInew * ) guarantee that A is not n-admissible. This is exactly what we need to conclude the proof as in [MS, Lemma 5.12] .
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